On 4 March 2026, the Parliament of Georgia adopted the Law “On Amendments to the Criminal Code of Georgia.”

The norms proposed by the amendments are completely unforeseeable, they are flawed from the linguistic as well as legal standpoint. Apart from that, they use concepts and terms that are uncommon to the Georgian criminal law, provide unlimited space for arbitrary and therefore, biased interpretations and most importantly, contradict fundamental human rights, the Constitution of Georgia, and the fundamental principles of criminal law. The amendments to the Criminal Code initiated on 4^th of March criminalize the civic and political activity of natural and legal persons, as well as their non-violent, peaceful acts, and constitute fertile ground for selective justice and political persecution.

The explanatory note to the amendments indicates that: (a) there are no European Union legal acts with which the amendments seek to approximate; (b) no consultations were conducted during the drafting process with state or non-state bodies, international organizations, experts, or working groups; (c) no such entities participated in the preparation of the draft law; (d) the draft law has not been subject to any expert or academic assessment; and (e) no comparative analysis of foreign legal systems or international practice was undertaken. Accordingly, the explanatory note of the draft law does not provide information as to which state’s legal traditions have ‘inspired’ the above amendments.

The present review addresses selected amendments[1] to the Criminal Code initiated on 4 March of the current year. Its purpose is to draw the attention of practicing lawyers, criminal law scholars, and the broader public to the notable and concerning aspects of the new provisions, as well as to the severe consequences of their practical application.

I. “Performing activities related to political matters concerning Georgia.” – a novelty in the Criminal Code

The amendments introduce new concepts into the Criminal Code, including “performing activities related to political matters concerning Georgia”[2]  and “publicly carrying out political activities.”[3]

The draft law provides a definition of “performing activities related to political matters concerning Georgia” for the purposes of Articles 194 and 319¹ (violation of the “Law on Grants”) of the Criminal Code, as well as Article 355³ of the Criminal Code (political activity of an entrepreneurial legal entity). The definitions of these concepts are identical; however, the legislator, for reasons that are not apparent, employs differing terminology across the dispositions of the three aforementioned articles. The rationale for this approach remains unclear.

(a) New concept introduced by the article on Money Laundering

The amendment introduces “money laundering for the purpose of carrying out activities related to political matters” as an aggravating circumstance of the offence of money laundering (Article 194(3)(d) of the Criminal Code).

The proposed formulation departs from the traditional concept of money laundering. The essence of the offence of money laundering consists in giving a lawful appearance to property or funds derived from previously committed criminal activity.

From a doctrinal perspective, money laundering is an instrumental offence, the purpose of which is to legalize property obtained through a predicate crime, conceal its origin, and integrate it into the financial system by various means. The traditional threat posed by money laundering is linked to organized crime, illicit activities (such as drug trafficking or arms trade), and corruption. In other words, the objective of money laundering is to confer a lawful, legitimate appearance on property acquired through illegal activities.

The object of money laundering is the integrity of the financial system, and its legitimate aim is to prevent the circulation of criminal proceeds within the legal financial framework. In other words, the immediate object of the offence is the financial system, while the subject matter of the crime is unlawful and/or unjustified property.

The core structure of money laundering is a purpose-based tort, while the act constitutes a crime at any stage of legalization or laundering. Accordingly, conduct at any stage of the laundering process is classified as a completed offence. This means that the provision set out in Article 194 of the Criminal Code prohibits the introduction of unlawfully obtained funds into legal circulation, as well as any financial operations or transactions connected with such proceeds. The logic of the money laundering offence is to prohibit the placement of funds derived from any illegal or criminal activity into the legal financial system and/or their use in any entrepreneurial or other economic activity.

(b) Additional aim of the new amendment – “political aim”

The formulation proposed by the amendment adds a new political aim to the existing purpose of the money laundering offence (Article 194 of the Criminal Code), as noted above.

It gives the impression that (1) the aggravation of the money laundering offence for the purpose of political activity serves to excessively criminalize political conduct (whereas, in fact, money laundering is punishable regardless of the intended use of the funds in any particular sector), and (2) at the same time, it may also aim to impart a political dimension to the offence of money laundering, which is not a proper aim from a criminal law perspective.

Change in the subjective element

Apart from the fact that introducing “an aim to carry out a political activity” as an aggravating circumstance for ‘money laundering’ (Article 194 of the Criminal Code) goes beyond the traditional criminal law understanding and traditional purpose of criminalizing this crime (money laundering), the new construction also changes/aggravates the subjective element of this crime (since an additional, second aim of this act is introduced). This means that, presumably, the investigation/prosecution must substantiate simultaneously the existence of both aims: the aim of placing illegally obtained money into legal circulation and, at the same time, the aim of using such money for political activity.

A crime with such a dual purpose is not recognized under the Criminal Code, except for the proposed new amendment. Under the proposed formulation, the sequence for establishing the purposes is unclear, since, as noted above, money laundering constitutes an offence at any stage of attempting to conceal its origin and introduce the funds into legal circulation. Accordingly, it is unclear at which point the conduct should be considered complete for the purposes of qualification under subparagraph (d) of paragraph (3) of Article 194 of the Criminal Code.

Standard of proof for the aim

The standard of proof of this dual aim/purpose in investigative and judicial practice is a separate issue altogether. This constitutes a serious problem and standard of how these aims should be proven seems completely vague. Under the new amendment, in order to qualify an act as an aggravated crime for the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to solely establish that the aim of political activity existed, without establishing the fact whether an act, itself – money laundering had actually been carried out or not. If we also take into account how the definition of “activity with a political aim”, itself, is formulated (the analysis of which is provided below), the standard of proving this aim becomes entirely ephemeral.

(c) The object of Money Laundering changes

The new amendment also changes the object of the offence. While the object of money laundering is the state’s financial system, under this amendment, the object would extend to governance, which is generally protected under a separate chapter of the Criminal Code, taking into account the social and public danger posed by offences directed against governance.

Doctrinal question: Why does the legislator consider money laundering to be a more serious offence when the so-called “dirty” money is laundered for the purpose of participating in a political campaign, rather than, for example, when it is intended for business purposes, used to bribe an official, for various forms of corrupt transactions, or to finance terrorism?

(d) What is the substantiation for the amendment of the article on money laundering?

If the rationale for the proposed amendment is the protection of the democratic process, then such a legal construction has no place in Article 194 of the Criminal Code. Any criminal regulation of conduct related to political activity should serve the purpose of safeguarding the integrity of the political process and protecting democratic institutions. This objective is neither specified nor can it reasonably fall within the protective scope, purpose, or function of the money laundering provision.

As noted, the new amendment places emphasis not on the origin of the money, but on its future purpose (political activity). In criminal law, punishment for the future targeted use of money is characteristic, for example, of financing terrorism and of other forms of assisting such activity (Article 331¹) – not of money laundering, in its classic form.[4] Accordingly, these articles are placed in other chapters of the Code.

The Criminal Code contains articles regulating unlawful interference in political processes and unlawful financing of political parties, for example, Article 164¹ of the Criminal Code – “Bribery of a voter.” This article simultaneously encompasses violations of the rules of financing of a political party, including direct and indirect transfer of money.

Article 186 of the Criminal Code criminalizes the use, possession, and other dealings with property (including money) obtained through criminal means, with prior knowledge of its illicit origin. Accordingly, the provision also covers the use of laundered funds by a third party, provided that such use does not constitute assistance in money laundering and constitutes an independent offence based on a separate purpose or motive.

The integration of a “political purpose” into the money laundering provision will undoubtedly create overlaps with other provisions of the Criminal Code and grant investigative and judicial authorities a wide scope for discretion in the legal assessment and qualification of conduct. Given the overall ambiguity and opacity of the proposed provisions in the Criminal Code, it is likely that, in cases where a political interest is alleged, each specific charge will tend to be resolved in favor of the more serious offence under the money laundering provision.

(e) The problem of proportionality:

Introducing “an aim to carry out a political activity” as an aggravating circumstance for ‘money laundering’ and therefore, aggravating the construction of the article on money laundering in such manner, also includes a legal problem of proportionality. From the point of view of legal technique to be used for constructing a norm within criminal law, an aggravating circumstance of an act must relate to:

• either greater harm;
• or a higher public danger.

The explanatory note of the proposed amendments does not demonstrate that financing any form of political activity in any manner is, by its nature, more dangerous, more harmful than:

• financing organized crime with e.g. “dirty” money;
• financing systemic economic crimes with e.g. “dirty” money;
• concluding corrupt transactions with e.g. “dirty” money;
• financing terrorism with e.g. “dirty” money, and others.

Therefore, provided that the argument regarding the danger of the participation of criminally obtained money in the political process is sufficiently substantiated, a legally correct construction would be the proposal of a clearly formulated special norm in another section, another chapter of the Criminal Code, for example – “illegal financing of the political process/parties with criminal proceeds.” However, in this case, the existing disposition of Article 186 of the Criminal Code must be taken into account, which, as noted above, prohibits the use of money obtained knowingly by illegal means. Apart from that, in my opinion, this prohibition also relates to the objective of protecting the integrity of the political process.

Accordingly, in light of the arguments provided above, from a doctrinal standpoint, introducing “an aim to carry out a political activity” into the article on money laundering is unsubstantiated.

II. Additional control of political activities by money laundering mechanisms

The unnatural new construction of the money laundering provision additionally entails a legally unjustified practical risk. Specifically, under such a legislative framework, any political or public activity would become subject to the mechanisms provided under the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, including oversight and monitoring by the Financial Monitoring Service. As a result, any actor participating in political or public processes would effectively fall within the scope of control and instruments established by the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing.

It is particularly noteworthy that the statutory “definition”[5] of “political activity” in the new amendment to the Criminal Code extends monitoring to activities that have not yet been carried out but may potentially occur in the future. As a result, the range of individuals and of political or public activities that could be subject to criminal liability, and, consequently, to financial monitoring under money laundering regulations, is entirely indeterminate.

III. Criminal “activities” instead of the “conduct”

Criminal law is the law of “conducts”, not of “activities.”

Under the Criminal Code which was in force prior to the 4^th of March amendments, the subject of adjudication was not merely a person’s thought, desire, character, influence, lifestyle, “activity,” but a specific act directed toward causing harm or creating danger.

The very first article of the Criminal Code makes clear that the law defines which conducts are criminal. It does not define which “activities” are criminal.

The concept of “activity” is foreign to and incompatible with the Criminal Code. In instances where the Code occasionally refers to the term “activity”, all such provisions point to other legislative acts that establish or define the relevant conduct.

In the present case, it is impossible to determine with certainty what the legislator intends by the criminally prohibited, punishable “political activity.” Does it refer to a single act, a series of acts, an expression, a discussion, a debate, criticism, or something else? The explanatory note to the draft law provides no explanation as to why the legislator deemed it necessary to introduce a term of uncommon etymology – “activity” – into criminal law, rather than the conventional term “conduct.”

(a) Criminal-law formulation of “political activity”

The formulation and definition of the proposed novation indicate that the legislator, in this concept, refers not to an act but to expression, criticism, discussion, or reasoning.

The definition[6] of the new concept employs terms such as “exerting influence on a segment of society” and “shaping policy,” which relate to expression and are connected with the dissemination of ideas and opinions, advocacy, discussion, criticism, and taking a position. All of these fall within the scope of freedom of expression in any democratic state. Political pluralism is a constitutional and fundamental right of individuals.

Criminal law in democratic states does not prohibit expression. Incitement is punishable only when it is used as a tool for violence or intolerance. To determine the boundary between freedom of expression and criminalized incitement, the legislation and judicial practice of democratic states apply the following test:

The Imminent Danger Test (U.S. model)

According to the standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court (Brandenburg v. Ohio), expression is punishable only if it:

• is directed toward provoking unlawful action; and there is a real danger that the relevant unlawful action shall be carried out with immediate[7]

“Hate Speech” (European model)

In European countries (and under the case law of the European Court of Human Rights), the level of standard is higher. Expression may be punished if it:

• incites hostility, violence, or discrimination on racial, religious, or other grounds;
• violates human dignity in such a way that it endangers public peace.

Direct incitement to violence

In any democratic system, criminal liability arises when expression includes:

• public support for terrorism or a call toward it;
• a threat to kill or physically retaliate against a specific person.

State security and constitutional order

Expression becomes punishable if it turns into an attempt to overthrow the constitutional order by violent means. Criticism, or a peaceful demand to change the system or the government, is protected by freedom of expression.

Accordingly, in democratic states, the main criterion for criminalizing conduct is the existence of a real and immediate danger of harm that may be inflicted upon a legally protected interest. Until the latest amendments, this approach was also shared by Georgian criminal legislation.

Criminal law in democratic countries does not punish non-violent conduct, and even less so non-violent political activity. In contrast to the standards of democratic states, the new amendments to the Criminal Code make the state’s punitive scope extend to opinion, and to lawful political and public processes, rather than to violent conduct.

The amendments to the Criminal Code of 4^th of March prohibit political activity that causes no harm, does not provoke violence, and does not incite hatred or intolerance, but merely seeks to exert influence on society. The prohibition also applies even when that influence is positive, beneficial, or neutral.

IV. “Political Activities” punishable under criminal law

Based on the relevant “Notes” of the newly amended provisions – Articles 194 and 319¹ of the Criminal Code, I have attempted to identify, somewhat precisely, the prohibited activities that under certain circumstances, shall entail criminal liability.[8]

According to the law, such activity is deemed to be:

(a) Activity already carried out or to be carried out in the future, the purpose of which is to exert any influence on the Government of Georgia, a state institution, or any part of society;

(b) Simultaneously, such activity must be directed toward shaping, implementing, or changing Georgia’s domestic or foreign policy;

(c) Activity of the same type that is or may be used for activities that derive from the public interests, approaches, and relations of a foreign state authority or a foreign political party.

I would like to draw the readers’ attention to the following terms used in the text of the law: “to exert any influence on any part of society,” “Georgia’s domestic and foreign policy,” “the shaping of domestic and foreign policy,” the “implementation” or “change” of such policy, “activity used for the political interest of a foreign state authority or a foreign party,” “activity used for the public interest of a foreign political party,” “activity used for the approaches of a foreign state authority and political parties,” and “activity used for the relations of a foreign state authority.”

This is an extremely broad, vague, linguistically defective and plainly subjective description of some unidentified political activities. With such definition, in practice, nearly any activity may be brought under the scope of criminal conduct. What is particularly noteworthy is that the above activities listed in the law, by their logical interpretation, are directly related to freedom of expression, as activities aimed at influencing other people, by rule, constitute to expressions of opinion, attitude or criticism, as well as persuasion. And the more convincing your opinion or argumentation shall be, the closer you may come to the risk of criminal prosecution.

Apart from the above, due to the completely vague wording quoted above (which grossly violates the criminal-law principle of lex certa), a person shall never be able to determine exactly what conduct gives rise to criminal liability.

The case law of the European Court of Human Rights is quite strict regarding such vague and overly broad legal norms. Moreover, the wording of the law—which criminalizes political activity, influence, or alignment with someone’s “interests,” in the absence of any violent component—directly and manifestly contradicts Articles 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the European Convention.

V. It is impossible to identify in advance which “political activities” are punishable

A good-faith interpretation and application of the criminalized “political activities” in investigative and judicial practice will be impossible.

Below, I will examine the political activities criminalized by law, grouped into categories:

(a) The first category of “political activities” is formulated as follows:

“Activity carried out or to be carried out in the future, the purpose of which is to exert any influence on the Government of Georgia, a state institution, or any segment of society”

It appears that the authors of the amendments expect that, in each individual case, the investigator or prosecutor must determine what constitutes a specific person’s “political activity” aimed at influencing government bodies or any segment of society. In doing so, no consideration is given to whether the purpose is non-violent or well-intentioned, nor to whether the influence is beneficial, acceptable, or of interest to a particular industry or social group.

Standard of proof: Relying on which objective criterion or evidentiary standard should the investigator/prosecutor determine a purpose that a given person sought when carrying out a given activity, or the influence that a certain activity had on a part of society? Which objective criterion or evidentiary standard should investigator/prosecutor rely on when determining what the relevant influence amounts to, or what number of people is necessary to reach the threshold of “a segment of society” (for the purposes of this article), or which types of such activity qualify as influence-exerting activities, and many more issues in connection herewith that are absurdities from legal and factual perspective.

For example: does a protest rally, a debate, criticism of the government, or a demonstration constitute as a means of influencing the government and society? Of course it is, and that is precisely the objective of this fundamental right – to influence the government, to make it change its views and decisions, to influence people, and to shape their attitudes toward a given issue.

It should be noted that the investigator/prosecutor must establish not only an activity that is already carried out, which could have influenced a segment of society, but also an activity, which has not yet been carried out, and which may not be carried out at all. To meet the standard of guilt established for this new offence, some ephemeral probability of political activity being carried out in the future, is sufficient.

(b) The second category of “political activity” is formulated as follows:

“Simultaneously, such activity must be directed toward shaping, implementing, or changing Georgia’s domestic and foreign policy”

Apparently, the authors of the amendments expect the investigator/prosecutor to determine what Georgia’s domestic and foreign policy is, at each and every specific moment when this allegedly “suspicious” political activity is being carried out and what Georgia’s domestic and foreign policy is, in relation to every specific, important issue for the society.

The authors of the amendments have overlooked the fact that there is no legislative definition of “domestic and foreign policy.” Who is supposed to determine what domestic and foreign policy is – the investigator? The prosecution? Which statement by which government official is to be regarded as the act that establishes a certain policy and renders it binding? By what evidence should the state’s domestic and foreign policy be established across the countless issues of public life?

The authors of these amendments apparently expect the investigator/prosecutor to distinguish between the “formation” of domestic and foreign policy – which has no statutory definition – and the “implementation” of that policy. Or should the investigator first establish what policy was “formed” / “implemented” on a given issue, and then prove what kind of a change a relevant natural or legal person sought when carrying out the above activity?

It should be noted that this influence-exerting activity, which aims at changing a ‘policy’ that is already formed, may not be factually committed by the person at all. Nevertheless, the mere possibility that such activity may be carried out in the future, is also punishable under the new amendment.

(c) The third category of “political activities” is formulated as follows:

“Activity of the same type that is or may be used for activities that derive from the public interests, approaches, and relations of a foreign state authority or a foreign political party”

The authors of these amendments imagine that the investigator/prosecutor must establish an activity that “is used” (unfortunately, the legislator could not find any better formal legal equivalent than the word “used” to express the idea) for the “public interests” of a foreign state or its political party. By what procedural standard can this be proven?

The authors of the law should know that, in such a case, the investigator must first determine the “public interest” of a particular foreign state and/or party on each specific issue. Generally, “public interest” is an extremely complex matter in legal theory and judicial practice and is used only in very rare cases. Here, however, the investigator should determine not only a “public interest” of his or her own country, but a “public interest” of a foreign state authority and/or some political party of that foreign state, and following this, the investigator should showcase that some political activity carried out in Georgia corresponds to the latter interest. Again, no account is taken of the usefulness of that activity, its noble aims, or its non-violent nature.

Then, the same investigator should also determine the “approaches” of the relevant foreign state or a party. Although it is unclear what approaches are implied by the law, they still must somehow be determined; and following this, the investigator should also determine the “relations” of the same foreign state, which a certain “activity” is allegedly “used” for – an activity, which intends to influence our country’s government or a state institution.

I would again draw the readers’ attention to the fact that such far-fetched activity does not need to be a completed act, which is already committed but may also be the one that may be carried out in the future. In other words, under the new amendment, punishable activity includes something that has not happened yet and that no one knows whether it would ever happen. Not to mention that, in order for the offence to be completed/committed, it does not make any difference whether this far-fetched activity actually influenced anyone or not.

What are these chaotic, defective, and outrageous legal constructions intended to achieve?

They are intended to implement the broad criminalization of civic activity and to subject all actors participating in the state’s life, any natural or legal person (active members of society, citizens critical of various events and processes, organizations) to the forced self-censorship and intimidation, to make sure that, under the conditions of complete uncertainty over the existence of grounds for criminal liability, and out of fear of severe punishment, none of them express their opinions on any issue of public concern.

VI. Entrepreneurial entities/businesses are prohibited from engaging in political discourse

Under the new amendments, it has become a criminal offence for a responsible person of a business entity to “publicly engage in political activity on behalf of, or through the name of, the same legal entity, where such activity is not related to the entity’s core entrepreneurial activities.”[9]

It should be noted that the cited norm refers to “such public political activity, which is not related to the entity’s core entrepreneurial activities.” The “Note” to the same article provides the same definition as the one given for Articles 194 and 319¹ of the Criminal Code; however, unlike these 2 articles, the emphasis is on “public” political activity rather than simply “political activity.” It is unclear how the “political activity” already defined in those two provisions of the Code differs from the “public political activity” declared prohibited for business, since any political activity is, by its nature, public.

Under the new amendment, public political activity carried out by a business is punishable if it is not related to the primary entrepreneurial activity of that entrepreneurial entity.

It should also be noted that the purpose of an entrepreneurial legal entity’s activity is never political activity; rather, the activity of an entrepreneurial legal entity is classically directed toward making profit. Public political activity belongs not to the sphere of entrepreneurial activity but to the sphere of the political rights and public positioning of natural and legal persons, which in every democratic system is a recognized and protected legal value.

(a) Conflict with the Constitution and applicable legislation

The Constitution of Georgia, the Civil Code, and the Law on Entrepreneurs guarantee the freedom of entrepreneurial activity, which means that participants in entrepreneurial relations may carry out any act not prohibited by law, including acts not expressly provided for by law. Freedom of activity and legal independence are what distinguish private-law entities from public-law entities. A business itself decides every issue concerning its activities and changes its field of activity, in accordance with its own assessment and without any permission (except in cases where the field of activities in question is subject to a legally required license, permit, or approval from the relevant regulatory authorities).

The Constitution of Georgia recognizes freedom of entrepreneurship.

Imposing criminal liability on a business entity solely because one of its activities “does not relate to its primary business” constitutes a grave intrusion by the state into the private autonomy of the entity, which is otherwise protected by law.

Moreover, imposing criminal liability on a business entity for engaging in an activity allegedly outside its “primary activity” also contradicts the Law on Entrepreneurs and the freedom of entrepreneurship guaranteed therein (Article 6). Under this law, an entrepreneurial entity is not required to define its scope of activity with precision. The law makes no distinction between “primary” and “non-primary” activities. An entity may simply state in its charter that its purpose is entrepreneurial activity in general, without specifying or designating a primary activity. Accordingly, all activities conducted by a business entity that do not require a permit or license are lawful and, moreover, fully legitimate.

In addition, imposing criminal liability on a business entity for engaging in activities outside its so-called “primary activity” also contravenes the Civil Code (Article 10 of the Civil Code).

It is impermissible for an investigator or prosecutor to determine for a business what constitutes its “primary entrepreneurial activity” or to decide what activities it may or may not undertake. A business is free to change the scope of its activities without obtaining any consent or amending its founding documents (excluding activities that require a permit or license, for which obtaining authorization is necessary).

For example:

• A bank expresses its position about elections – is that related to its primary entrepreneurial activity?
• An IT company criticizes the state’s cybersecurity policy – is that related to its primary entrepreneurial activity?
• A restaurant issues a statement on media freedom or environmental protection – is that related to its primary entrepreneurial activity?

Accordingly, in light of the legal deficiencies in the relevant provision of the Criminal Code, it can be concluded that the proposed wording (Article 355³ of the Criminal Code) effectively prohibits a business from any political or public positioning, activity, or participation in political discourse. This is because political and public activity is never considered a business’s primary entrepreneurial activity; therefore, any political or public positioning or activity by the business will always be deemed an activity outside its entrepreneurial scope.

Article 17 of the Constitution of Georgia and Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, protect freedom of expression. In particular, this means freedom of political opinion, freedom of political debate, and freedom to criticize the government. The caselaw of the European Court (e.g. VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, No. 24699/94, 28 June 2001) recognizes that legal entities also enjoy freedom of expression, especially on matters of public interest.

(b) Who may be the subject of this offence?

The subject of the offence includes both (i) the legal entity itself and (ii) its responsible person acting on behalf of, or through, the legal entity.

Of particular concern is the consequence of liability for the legal entity – either a fine or a fine combined with its liquidation.

The person acting on behalf of the legal entity is authorized to represent it under the Law on Entrepreneurs. Accordingly, for the legal entity to be held liable, the publicly conducted political activity must be carried out by a person authorized to act on its behalf.

However, it is unclear who qualifies as the “responsible person” of the legal entity for the purposes of Article 355³ of the Criminal Code.

The Law on Entrepreneurs does not define a “responsible person” of a legal entity; rather, it defines persons authorized for management and representation.[10]

Practical example: if the chief accountant of a business entity speaks on television and the caption identifies him or her as the accountant of a specific company, should that be considered acting by means of the legal entity’s name?

Who is to determine who is the subject of the offence provided for in Article 355³ of the Criminal Code – physical person? Who is to determine – the public activity of which officer of that legal entity may lead to the liability of that physical person and the legal person, simultaneously – including liquidation?

The relevant provision of the Criminal Code is defective in this respect, which clearly creates fertile ground for additional arbitrariness, compounded by the fact that the “non-primary activity” prohibited for business may be arbitrarily determined at the discretion of the investigator, prosecutor, and court, rather than by the Law on Entrepreneurs.

The liquidation of a legal entity and the criminal liability of its “responsible person” for “public political activity” is an extremely repressive and disproportionate measure, the equivalent of which cannot be found in the legislation of European states. In the civilized world, there is no prohibition on legal entities or its representatives publicly expressing and supporting political positions; rather, there are regulations concerning the financing of political parties.

The cumulative chilling effects of the amendments:

• Selective application of legal norms, linked to incomprehensible and vague wording (“deriving from foreign political… approaches”). The prosecution shall enjoy broad discretion to determine what kind of activities carried by which organizations or persons should be considered as a crime. This will inevitably encourage selective and politically motivated enforcement of the law.
• Disabling the civil society and the media, since NGOs, non-profit organizations, research centers, and independent media shall be forced to restrict their activities to the maximum. Any public activity/campaign (for example, advocating environmental requirements or judicial reform) may be assessed as a conduct aimed at changing the government’s domestic and foreign policy and accordingly, may be qualified as a criminal offence.
• Complete confusion and devaluation of the standard of proof, which, for example, concerns activities/acts, which are not yet carried out. Phrases such as “may be used for” and “activity to be carried out” disregard any evidentiary standard whatsoever. The investigator/prosecutor shall no longer need reliable proof evidencing that a certain grant or funds were specifically used for a prohibited political activity; Even an assumption that they “could have been” used for such a purpose in the future, shall be deemed sufficient.
• Excessive caution by financial institutions (over-compliance): commercial banks may refuse to provide services to civil society actors, and to any natural or legal person, in order to avoid the risk of being accused of facilitating money laundering.
• Business held hostage by the state: any “undesirable” activity by a business and its representatives may become grounds for shutting down the business and imprisoning its managers.

The amendments to the Criminal Code of Georgia, enacted on 4 March 2026, effectively ensure the forced exclusion of active members of civil society, the media, and the Georgian business community and its representatives from political and public discourse, through the threat of criminal sanctions.

[1] The remaining provisions of these amendments (including those relating to “extremism” and others) will be addressed in a separate document

[2] The legislator uses this term in the disposition of Article 194 part 3 subparagraph “d” and Article 355³

[3] The legislator uses this term in the disposition of Article 355³

[4] According to Article 331¹ of the Criminal Code, terrorist activity is punishable regardless of the legality of the origin of the monetary funds used for this purpose, which is a correct legal construction

[5] See part 5 of the “Note” to the Article 194 of Criminal Code

[6] See Part 5 of the “Note” to Article 194 of the Criminal Code and Part 2 of the “Note” to Article 319¹

[7] Example: calling on a crowd to burn down a specific building when the crowd is ready to do so

[8] I am not discussing the preconditions at this stage, as in one case they relate to the basic disposition of money laundering, and in the other, to the requirements of the Law on Grants

[9] Article 355³ of the Criminal Code of Georgia: “Political Activity of an Entrepreneurial Legal Entity”

[10] Article 9 of the “Law on Entrepreneurs”